Abstract-The densification of mobile networks with small cells (SCs) is one promising solution to address the explosive increase in data traffic. Due to their financial implementation requirements, which could not be met by mobile service providers (MSPs), the emergence of third parties that deploy SC networks creates new business opportunities. In this paper, we study the Small Cell as a Service (SCaaS) business model, where MSPs lease the SC infrastructure from a small-cell operator (SCO) to offload their traffic. In SCaaS, the SCO requires a licensed spectrum for the SC operation, which must be provided by MSPs. We introduce a proportional fair auction scheme for the SC capacity distribution and the corresponding transactions. We examine the MSPs' profit and throughput for the dedicated and co-channel spectrum deployments, various SC deployments, and different levels of MSP competition in the auctions. We propose a learning mechanism that improves the bidders' strategies for realistic cases without information in the traffic and the auctions. Extensive simulations give insight into SCaaS's techno-economic aspects, the MSPs' strategies, and their impact on the system. Finally, our results prove our mechanism's efficiency, which performs similarly to the optimal social welfaremaximization optimal results. Index Terms-Mobile data offloading, Small Cell as a Service (SCaaS), economic framework, cost reduction.
I. INTRODUCTION

M
OBILE data traffic is expected to increase exponentially during the next few years [1] . Therefore, it becomes urgent for mobile operators to maintain sustainable capacity growth to meet these new demands. In order to respond to this challenge, the mobile industry needs to enhance the networks' infrastructure. One of the most promising solutions for the increase of the network capacity is the densification of the Radio Access Network (RAN) with small cells (SCs), and their use for mobile data offloading. Nevertheless, and despite its potential, a ubiquitous deployment of SCs imposes In order to gain traffic offloading profit, the MSPs can lease SC infrastructure from emerging third party neutral hosts, known as Small cell Service Providers (SSPs). The SSPs own SC networks at hotspots, where the MSPs have essential capacity needs. Consequently, the cooperation of an MSP with SSPs relieves the former from a large investment, and enables the provision of pervasive service. Even though outsourcing traffic offloading is a cost-effective way to address capacity needs, it also poses new challenges. Due to the recent emergence of this business model, there is not yet a general framework for a traffic offloading market. Note that there is a wide range of use cases under this business model, which may vary from an arrangement between an MSP and the owner of a single SC, to an agreement among multiple MSPs and a venue (e.g. airport, stadium etc.) owner. Hence, in order to assure long-term sustainability, a framework should be designed to address the arisen technological challenges and the economic incentives for all involved parties.
As it will be shown in the literature review, most works consider scenarios where the SSPs have their own licensed spectrum. However, an MSP/SSP can acquire licensed spectrum only through national auctions, which raise the license fees to billions of euros [2] . MSPs provide their services on a nation-wide scale, which gains them enough revenue to cover their CAPEX, OPEX, as well as a licence fee within the licence's duration. On the contrary, a local SSP can provide his services in a limited geographical area, which also sets limits to his revenues. Consequently, there is low probability for a local SSP to obtain licensed bandwidth, and deploy an SC network that provides significant Return on Investment (ROI). 1 In contrast to the state-of-the-art (SoA), we study the business case of the multi-operator RAN (MORAN) sharing model [3] . This business model, which is known as Small Cell as a Service (SCaaS) [4] , is conceived solely as an infrastructure to service a set of MSPs, which is usually deployed by a third party neutral host known as Small Cell Operator (SCO). The main difference with the SoA lies in the fact that even though the SC infrastructure is shared among the MSPs, the TRX/RF aspects (i.e. licensed bandwidth, schedulers etc.) are not shared. Hence, each MSP applies his own policy on how his users are served. This means that only the MSPs have the exclusive right to use their licensed spectrum, and therefore 1 ROI is defined as the benefit of an investment relative to its cost.
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the SCO can only use such spectrum after mutual Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the corresponding MSPs, e.g. the spectrum manager leasing arrangement or the de facto leasing arrangement [5] .
As for the financial aspects of the deployment of any SC network, the initial investment required to cover high traffic zones all over the coverage area of the MSPs may be unaffordable for a single actor. The SCaaS approach allows MSPs to distribute such high CAPEX among several SCOs (i.e. different SCOs in different locations), but in turn this CAPEX reduction is translated into an increase of the MSPs' OPEX via the price to use the SC network.
It is precisely due to the link between MSPs' and SCOs' financial structure that, for a given SCaaS deployment, it is necessary to strike a balance between the increase of the MSPs' network capacity (achieved by offloading traffic through the SCO network) and the costs associated to the SCO network usage. In turn, the SCO revenues must be high enough to recoup the deployment investment, though low enough to stimulate offloading strategies of the MSPs. This situation becomes even more complex in competitive environments, where several MSPs compete in an auction for the usage of the limited SCO resources. Considering the above, SCaaS can be an efficient and cost-effective solution that addresses the MSPs' future capacity requirements. Hence, SCaaS's wide adoption by MSPs will facilitate the SCOs' existence economically feasible.
The use of the MSPs' spectrum by an SCO may seem radical, considering the importance and value of this asset. As mentioned previously, MORAN allows MSPs to choose the service policy at the SCO infrastructure and also broadcast their public land mobile network (PLMN) identities [3] . That is, an SCaaS agreement makes the leased SCs to appear as part of the MSPs' networks, with the difference of being operated by a neutral host. Further proof for the feasibility of SCaaS has been the provision of managed services and partnerships in the past decade from large vendors such as Ericsson [6] . Ericsson has also introduced its own SCaaS business model [7] , in which the role of the SCO is the design, planning, deployment and management of the small cell network. Thus, it is apparent that the MSPs will tend to outsource traffic offloading instead of deploying ubiquitously their own SCs.
So far, relevant studies have addressed the traffic offloading problem with a game theoretical approach, mainly modeling it with auction schemes [8] - [11] . An iterative double auction mechanism, managed by an independent broker, is proposed in [8] . The broker guarantees truthfulness in bidding, hence maximizing the market's efficiency while maintaining his profit. An auction-based incentive framework for leasing ondemand resources is presented in [9] . The MSP conducts reverse auctions with the third parties, generating the incentive for them to sell their capacity. In a similar way, a VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) auction-based incentive framework for accessing selfish femtocells is studied in [10] . In it, the MSP conducts a multi-unit reverse auction for a single macrocell user scenario, whereas a double auction scheme is conducted for multiple macrocell users. A multiple reserve price based auction mechanism that considers imprecise valuations, named EasyBid, is proposed in [11] . Heuristic algorithms are used in order to conduct truthful auctions between an MSP and femtocell owners, taking into account the fact that the sellers have knowledge of their perceived valuations, which could differ from the actual ones.
Traffic offloading through a third party, with WiFi or femtocell access points (APs), is considered in [12] . The authors use a two-stage multi-leader multi-follower game, called data offloading game (DOFF), where the BSs offer prices to the APs, and the latter decide the offloading volume. A distributed market pricing framework where mobile data flows are offloaded to APs is proposed in [13] . The problem is formulated with a Stackelberg game, for the cases of APs with limited and unlimited capacity, and a distributed pricing algorithm is proposed for the convergence to an equilibrium. A refunding framework for offloading MNO traffic to SC holders' (SHs) networks with limited capacity is proposed in [14] . The problem is formulated with a two-stage refunding admission game, where the MNO is the leader, and the SHs are the followers.
An economic framework for traffic offloading to privately owned femtocells is described in [15] . The femtocells can be accessed by an MSP's public users through a hybrid access mode, and profit sharing is used to motivate the femtocell owners to offload traffic. A two-stage sequential game is modeled for revenue distribution, resource allocation, and service selection. Similarly, in [16] the authors propose an ACcess Permission (ACP) transaction framework. This enables an MSP to buy ACP from multiple (geographically overlapping) SSPs. An adaptive strategy updating algorithm, based on an online learning process, is used for improving the SSPs strategies.
The data offloading problem is studied for the first time with the use of a one-to-many bargaining model in [17] . The scenario is modeled as a monopoly, where one MNO bargains in a sequential or concurrent manner with third party access point owners (APOs) for offloading its traffic. In [18] , although the scenario is similar, the situation differs, since all of the service providers' subscribers also play a major role in the dynamic selection of their service provider. A hierarchical dynamic game framework models the interactive decisions, and an evolutionary game describes the subscriber's service selection. As for the transactions between the MSP and the SSPs, they are modeled with a Stackelberg differential game. The problem of traffic offloading through a third-party WiFi AP from the MNO's perspective is examined in [19] . The MNO wants to maximize his revenue when Successive Interference Cancellation (SIC) is applied to the system. The problem is solved with both a centralized approach and a threshold-based distributed offloading scheme, showing the SIC benefits on the MNO's revenue. This paper, which is an extension of our preliminary previous work [20] , examines the case where a monopolistic SCO offers SCaaS to multiple MSPs, addressing the scenarios with a single SCO in the area under study (e.g. stadiums, airports etc.). Particularly, this paper investigates the interaction of the capacity needs and the economic constraints of the stakeholders, and aims to gain insight into technoeconomic implications of the SCaaS paradigm. While in [20] we proposed a novel learning mechanism for improving the MSPs' bidding strategies, in this paper we extend our analysis by studying the MSPs' auction strategies, and their impact on the system. Our approach on offloading (i.e. SCaaS) as well as this analysis differentiates our work from the literature, where more weight is given to the economic side of the problem. The main contributions are summarized in the following:
• We consider the analytical model for traffic offloading under the SCaaS proposed in [20] as the basis for developing a more realistic model, which extends the analysis to multiple SC clusters, and includes the technological constraints (e.g. bandwidth availability, backhaul capacity) and the financial goals of each stakeholder. • The SCaaS model can be implemented under two spectrum deployment use cases: i) the dedicated spectrum deployment, and ii) the co-channel deployment. This work shows the profit-capacity trade-off for each use case and proposes the mathematical framework to define the capacity limits of SCaaS in each use case.
• As the stakeholders' profit and the total system capacity depend highly on i) the deployment density (i.e. density of deployed eNBs and SCs), ii) the MSPs' competition level (i.e. the capacity needs of each MSP), iii) the SCO backhaul capacity, iv) the reuse or not of the spectrum bands, and v) each actor's cost function, the presented results offer useful insights to select the adequate values of the parameters involved in the SCaaS approach.
• The proposed auction scheme relies on the perfect knowledge of the MSPs' future loads. As each MSP is not aware of its future load and the future load of the contending MSPs (due to future uncertainty, as well as privacy of sensitive information), we provide a mathematical framework based on a new learning mechanism to overcome the lack of reliable information. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model, and Section III states the stakeholders' objectives. Section IV describes the auction scheme, the Social Welfare Maximization problem, and the learning mechanism devised to estimate the key variables in the absence of relevant knowledge. Numerical results and analysis are presented in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper and discusses possible future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The aim of this paper is to study traffic offloading for the SCaaS business model, and gain insight into its technoeconomic trade-offs. The scenario is characterized by multiple non-overlapping hotspot areas served by multiple MSPs and where a third party has deployed a number of SC clusters. As the hotspot areas are geographically limited, each MSP covers the hotspot areas with a single eNB, 2 as shown in Fig. 1a . Therefore, the system model is constituted by one eNB per MSP and N C SCO clusters (one in each hotspot area). The set of eNBs is denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , N} and the MSP owner of eNB i ∈ N is denoted by M SP i . The set of SCO clusters is denoted by N C = {1, 2, . . . , N C }, where an SC cluster l ∈ N C consists of N sc l small cells, and is connected to the internet or to the core network through a backhaul network with a capacity C BH l (in Mbps). C BH l is therefore the capacity of the link between the SC cluster l and the core network/internet, and it is upper bounded by the backhaul technology, such as a wireless mm-wave link or an optical fibre connection [25] . We assume a frequency reuse factor 1 for the SC tier. Although in Fig. 1a eNBs from different MSPs are not co-sited, the subsequent analysis can be also used for RAN sharing scenarios (i.e. when multiple MSPs share a single eNB), as it only assumes that the average spectral efficiency of the diverse eNBs is the same. Each BS is characterized by the spectral efficiency, defined as the transmission rate achievable per bandwidth unit, and the available bandwidth. For a given M SP i , the available licensed bandwidth is denoted by B i (in MHz) and the spectral efficiency SE i (in Mbps/Hz) can be approximated by
is the mathematical expectation and SIN R ik is the Signal-to-Interfernece-plusNoise ratio of a user k served by M SP i . For an SC cluster l, the spectral efficiency is defined analogously and denoted by SE sc l . In turn, the maximum bandwidth supported by each SC is denoted by B sc and it is limited either by the technology's specifications or by the deployed hardware's capabilities. Based on these definitions, the capacity of M SP i , defined as the maximum throughput that can be served by M SP i , is given by C i = B i SE i . As for the capacity of the SC cluster l, it is given by N sc l B sc SE sc l . Note that, whereas the traffic served by M SP i is limited by its capacity C i , the traffic served by the SC cluster l is limited either by C BH l or by the SC cluster capacity, i.e.
Let us define the offered load of M SP i as L i (in Mbps). This offered load can be divided into two components: the offered load generated within each hotspot (L h il with L hi = l∈NC L h il ) and the offered load generated elsewhere (
Each of these components can vary in time and space. During time periods where L hi is low, the need for capacity provided by the SCO declines. Conversely, high hotspot loads result in a raising interest for the usage of the SCO infrastructure. Hereafter, the day is divided into a set T = {1, 2, . . . , T } of equal timeframes, during which the load is considered constant. It is nonetheless worth noting that, even though the load in a timeframe t ∈ T is not necessarily the same every day, it follows a day pattern. Even though the realtime offered load and user SE do not remain constant during a timeframe, their instantaneous variations from their average (i.e. L i , SE i and SE sc l ) can be disregarded when considering a timeframe's offloading decision [9] .
As it will be shown in Section IV, an M SP i needs to estimate both L hi and the corresponding distribution of bandwidth in the two tiers, for serving his load as well as his profit maximizing objective. To that end, and since it is not possible to know beforehand the actual spectral efficiency of every single user roaming the system, we use SE i and SE sc l . However, this assumption introduces some limitations. Particularly, as a user roams an SC, her spectral efficiency will be at times either higher or lower than SE sc l , leading to lower or higher requirement of bandwidth at the SC tier respectively. In case of higher bandwidth requirements, it is possible that part of L hi will not be served. This can further lead to MSP revenue and profit loss as it will be shown in Section III-B.
Regarding the provided SC capacity, it is true that it should reflect the MSPs' demand. However, increasing the capacity requires the further instalment of SC and backhaul infrastructure. Such deployments and the corresponding SC capacity pricing for the recoup of their investment are always part of a long-term business plan. Hence, since our system model examines SCaaS on a day-to-day basis and short timeframes according to the traffic's trends (e.g. hours), the study of additional SC infrastructure and its corresponding pricing are out of the scope of this paper.
III. STAKEHOLDERS' NETWORK AND FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES
MSPs have a two-fold objective. First, they must guarantee the users' QoS. Second, the network must be managed so as to maximize their economic profit. On the other hand, the SCO aims to repay the deployment investment and generate profit. In the following, the analyses of the MSP throughput, and the stakeholders' profit are detailed.
A. MSP Throughput
In this paper, we consider that the QoS of an M SP i 's users is guaranteed by serving the offered load. In other words, the users receive satisfactory service when The transferred bandwidth percentages of all MSPs are given by matrix x = ( x i : ∀i ∈ N). Hence, an M SP i provides x il B i of its bandwidth at each SC cluster l. Thus, the M SP i will be allowed to offload a maximum load through the SCO equal to
Since the SCaaS approach requires the transfer 4 of licensed bandwidth from the MSP to the SCO, the way in which the transfer is conducted will impact the system performance. Specifically, the deployment of HetNets presents two use cases regarding the SC tier spectrum band deployment: the dedicated spectrum deployment and the co-channel deployment. The former (dedicated spectrum) is characterized by the orthogonal use of spectrum in the SCO and the MSP. Thus, an M SP i that transfers a band X i B i to the SCO only uses the nontransferred spectrum band (i.e. (1 − X i )B i ) at the eNB. Conversely, in the latter (co-channel deployment) the spectrum is partially reused by the two tiers, and the eNB makes use of the whole band B i regardless of the transferred spectrum to the SC tier, X i B i . These differences are outlined in Fig. 1b . In the sequel, superindexes D and C differentiate the dedicated spectrum deployment and the co-channel deployment parameters, respectively.
According to interesting studies, the achieved throughput depends on the use case (co-channel and dedicated spectrum), and the key parameter that differentiates them is the spectral efficiency of the SCO, SE sc , which is higher for the dedicated spectrum use case than for the co-channel use case (SE [21] . Thus, for a given load L sc il , the bandwidth required by the SCO in the dedicated spectrum case is less than the bandwidth required in the co-channel case,
This fact causes differences in the maximum throughput.
Proposition 1 (Dedicated Spectrum Deployment Throughput): Given an M SP i that transfers x D i B i MHz to the SCO, the throughput in dedicated spectrum deployment is expressed as
where
Proof: L hi can be served completely by the SCO or jointly served between the SCO and M SP i . If the offered load in the hotspot is completely served by the SCO, the transferred bandwidth reaches its maximum and it holds that
Proposition 2 (Co-Channel Deployment Throughput): Given an M SP i that transfers x C i B i MHz to the SCO, the total load served in a co-channel deployment is expressed as
where SE C i is the average spectral efficiency of M SP i in co-channel bands, and
Proof: In a co-channel deployment, the bandwidth transferred from M SP i to the SCO is simultaneously shared by M SP i with average spectral efficiency SE As already observed, the spectral efficiency determines the MSP's and the offloading capacity. In turn, it depends greatly on aspects such as the number of SCs, location or bandwidth allocation, thereby impacting on the MSP's served traffic, by limiting or increasing the achievable maximum throughput. Therefore, the maximum served load is achieved with the cochannel deployment in some scenarios, and with dedicated spectrum deployment in some others. The selection of each deployment depends on the ratio between spectral efficiencies.
Proposition 3 (Spectrum Deployment Selection): Given an M SP i with L i and an SCO, if
Proof: Let us define the difference between the load served in a co-channel scenario (L CT i ) and the load served in a dedicated spectrum deployment (
The co-channel deployment will achieve higher served load if Θ i > 0. By using (1) and (3),
According to the results in [21] , SE i is expected to be slightly higher for the dedicated spectrum deployment (i.e. 
B. MSP Profit
As mentioned earlier in this section, the MSPs' objectives are twofold, since they embrace both financial and capacity aspects. Specifically, M SP i aims at maximizing the profit (P i ), defined as the revenue minus the expenses, while guaranteeing the QoS. It should be noted that in order to offload his traffic, each M SP i partakes in auctions conducted by the SCO for each SC cluster, at the beginning of each timeframe. In the auctions, each M SP i bids an amount of money b i (b il : ∀l ∈ N C ), b il ∈ R + to use the SCO infrastructure. Then, the SCO distributes the SC capacity to the MSPs according to the placed bids. Hence, the profit can be written as (6) where R i is the revenue per throughput unit (e/Mbps), and CL i is the load cost. CL i includes variable costs such as energy cost, maintenance cost etc. As shown in (6) , M SP i 's profit (P i ) is not only tightly coupled with L T i but also with the load cost (CL i ). The load cost has been widely modeled in the literature with the use of convex functions [8] , [9] , [12] , [17] , [23] . The use of a convex function is suitable for describing the network congestion cost as well as the effect of subscriber churn. Particularly, during peak traffic periods the load cost increases rapidly, depicting the economic consequences of congestion. Hence, let us assume that CL i is also convex, and can be expressed as
where C i (in Mbps) is the maximum capacity of M SP i without offloading, factor a i defines the rate with which the cost increases (in e /Mbps), and d i (in Mbps) moves the asymptotic discontinuity of the cost function to
Note that when the M SP i network operates at its maximum capacity
, the load cost is high but not infinite. Therefore, d i > 0. These parameters are used to adjust the cost function of the economic entity.
C. SCO Profit
The SCO aims to recoup both his investment and operational cost, and generate profit P sc , by leasing out large volumes of SC capacity at high prices. The profit is defined as the sum of the profits of each SC cluster l, P sc l , which in turn is given by the difference of the MSPs' bids deducting the load cost, denoted as CL sc l . Hence, the profit can be written as
Due to the differences in the structure of the MSP network and the SCO network, as well as their operation and maintenance, each financial entity is characterized by a different OPEX, and therefore a different cost. Despite the difference of the magnitude of MSP and SCO OPEX, these two economic entities offer the same type of service. In this sense, network congestion impacts in a similar manner the SCO's finances. Therefore, the SC cluster l's load cost can be also described as a convex function 
or alternatively, a minimum profit expressed as P
is found by substituting (9) and (10) in
IV. THE AUCTION
The distribution of the existing resources, that is, the available spectrum and the cost of using the SCO infrastructure, are the response to two main objectives: firstly, the QoS guaranty (the capacity objective), and secondly high profit generation (the economic objectives of both the MSPs and the SCO). In this scenario, the auction is the mechanism by which the interaction of these competing objectives results in incentives for all the involved parties.
A. The Auction Mechanism
An auction is a trading process for goods or services, where potential buyers bid money in order to decide the buyer(s), the price of the good, and its distribution. In any auction there are three aspects that must be defined: the auctioneer (i.e. the auction-conducting party), the bidders (i.e. the buying parties) and the good to be auctioned. In the scenario under study, the SC clusters' capacity is the auctioned good, the SCO plays the role of the auctioneer, and the MSPs are the bidders. At the beginning of each timeframe t, the SCO conducts an individual auction for each SC cluster l ∈ N C , during which each M SP i places a bid b il . Given the set of bids, the SCO distributes L sc l in a proportionally fair manner [22] , and informs the MSPs about the actual volume of leased capacity L sc il , i ∈ N . The proportional fair allocation rule charges all bidders with the same price per SC capacity ratio, and hence there is no possibility for overcharging. Hence, the MSPs have a fair chance to serve more traffic (i.e. network incentive) and gain profit (i.e. economic incentive). Furthermore, we assume that the auction is a sealed-bid auction. This type of auctions are characterized by the simultaneous submission of bids, so that none of the bidders know the bids of the rest of bidders. 
where L sc l is found by solving i∈N b il = zCL sc l (L sc l ).
B. Conducting the Auction 1) Social Welfare:
In this section we address the traffic offloading problem as a Social Welfare Maximization (SWM) problem. The SW is defined as the aggregate payoff of all the MSPs and the SCO. The maximization takes into account the availability of MSPs' resources, as well as technical constraints imposed by the SC cluster deployment. Hence, by replacing (1) and (7) in (6), and (9) in (8) the SWM problem for the dedicated spectrum deployment 5 is formulated as
The optimization problem in (12) maximizes the aggregate profit of all the stakeholders constrained by the availability of resources to be transferred from M SP i∈N to the SCO (12a), the technological limits of the SCs (12b), and the backhaul capacity (12c). Constraints (12b) and (12c) limit the capacity of the SCO infrastructure, and consequently results in a competition among MSPs. Likewise, it is worth noting that bids are cancelled out in (12) , since b i∈N is a cost for M SP i but in turn it is a revenue for the SCO. This is the reason why bids are not explicitly included in (12), although they are implicitly included in P sc , since there is a minimum SCO profit (or a minimum SCO revenue) to create an incentive for offloading according to Proposition 4. Therefore, we define the reserve price by combining (11), (9) and (10) 
5 The SWM problem formulation for the co-channel deployment is derived in the same manner by replacing (3) in (6).
All MSPs are interested in bidding the reserve price to maximize their profit, which can be calculated with (13) if all information is available to all MSPs.
Note that the bids are cancelled out in (12) . That is, the bids and the auction are connected with the SWM problem through the allocation of the SC capacity L sc l (as described in Definition 1). L sc l and the bids determine the SC capacity allocation, and in turn the MSP throughput. That is, the solution of (12) determines the bids and the transferred bandwidth percentage matrix x. However, as it can be observed in (12) this solution depends on both network (i.e. SE i , B i , SE sc l , N sc l , C BH l ) and economic (i.e. R i , z etc.) parameters of the stakeholders.
2) Learning Mechanism: In realistic competitive SCaaS scenarios, MSPs cannot have the information to bid the reserve prices (b il , l ∈ N C ). Since the auctions are conducted at the beginning of the timeframe, M SP i cannot know its own load. In addition, bids and load of the rest of the MSPs are not public (i.e., b j and L j , for j ∈ N \{i}, are unknown to M SP i ). Given that, M SP i must estimate the load in the hotspots (L h il ), the load outside the hotspots (L ni ) and the aggregate bids of the opponents ( j∈N \{i} b jl , l ∈ N C , henceforth denoted by b jl =i for simplicity) to properly select each b il . Hence, the more accurate the estimations are, the better the auction results are. In the following, estimates for offered load and opponents' bids are denoted as L i and b jl =i , respectively. Analogously to the SWM problem stated in (12), the maximization of the profit remains as the objective. However, in a competitive environment with limited available information, each M SP i formulates the problem as
where 
The expression is obtained by combining (11) and (13) 
The learning mechanism described in the sequel is designed to accurately estimate the load and b jl =i at an SC cluster l. The bid selection is run at every timeframe by each MSP. Our proposed learning mechanism consists of three components: a forecasting method to predict the offered load (L i and/or L hi ), and two methods to estimate b jl =i (a reinforcement learning algorithm along with an adaptive search range scheme). a) Traffic forecasting: In order to forecast the MSPs' traffic loads L i and L hi , the well-known and computationally efficient Holt-Winters (HW) method [27] is used. Also known as Triple Exponential Smoothing, it takes into account the level, trend and seasonal changes in the observed dataset. There are two HW models according to the type of the seasonality (described as the periodic repetition in time-series data), known as multiplicative and additive seasonal models. The former refers to a proportional change in the values of the time series from season to season, whereas the latter refers to a particular absolute change. In our case, the multiplicative model is used to capture the random, small, seasonal variations of the traffic pattern. The learning algorithm devised to estimate the opponents' bids must be able to find out b jl =i in A b jl =i . Nevertheless, using a continuous set is shown inefficient in these scenarios, since the convergence requires thousands of iterations. Let us then define the uniform discretization of A b jl =i as the discrete set of K elements
Definition 3 (Holt-Winters Method [27]): At timeframe t ∈ T , let us define the forecast offered load for timeframe (t + m) ∈ T , with m ∈ N >0 , as L t+m . According to HW method, L t+m is calculated as L t+m = (S t + mv t )I t−T +m , where S t is a (smoothed) estimate of the level (i.e. a local average of the dataset), v t is an estimate of the linear trend (slope) of the time series, I t denotes the seasonal component (i.e. the expectation for a specific timeframe based on its past season values), and T = |T | is the number of daily timeframes (season length).
..K , and the probability of each element of A b jl =i at timeframe t of day n as p kl (t, n), for k = 1 . . . K. Note that the opponents' bids are linked with their capacity needs, which in turn are related to the previous timeframes' needs, and follow a daily pattern. Therefore, p kl (t, n) is correlated both with p kl (t−1, n) and p kl (t, n − 1). In the following a modification of the reinforcement learning algorithm Exp3 [28] , is presented in Algorithm 1. The application of Exp3 and the modification shown hereafter to the discrete set A b jl =i turns the selection of each b jl =i into a non-stochastic multi-armed bandit problem, where each b jl =i ∈ A b jl =i is regarded as one arm.
Algorithm 1 is designed to continuously update p kl (t, n), which is initialized for each SC cluster l at day n 0 as p kl (t, n 0 ) = 1 K for k = 1 . . . K and t = 1 . . . T . Later, for every t ∈ T and n > n 0 , p kl (t, n) is updated based on the accuracy of the estimation. Although Algorithm 1 is aimed to estimate b jl =i , the actual value of b jl =i is not available to M SP i even after the auction. Hence, the accuracy of b jl =i must be controlled indirectly through an alternative variable, such as L sc il . We define the relative difference of estimated and actual L sc il at timeframe t of day n as
where L sc il (t, n) and L sc il (t, n) are the estimated and the actual offloaded load at timeframe t of day n.
0. Based on the accuracy of the estimation, p kl (t, n) will be updated through a reward defined as follows: for a given estimate
e. equal to the kth element of A b jl =i ) the reward for an accurate estimation at timeframe t of day n, referred to as r kl (t, n) ∈ [0, 1], must be close to 1. Conversely, if b jl =i is not accurate, then r kl (t, n) should be smaller than 1. In the same vein, if ΔL sc il (t, n) is similar to ΔL sc il (t, n−ν), with ν ∈ N >0 , the reward should be high since load and bids present a strong daily pattern. Thus, we define the reward as
where μ ΔL sc il and σ ΔL sc il are the mean and the standard deviation of ΔL sc il , μ HW and σ HW are the respective thresholds, and (x) + = max(0, x). Accordingly, given an estimate b jl =i equal to the k * th element of A b jl =i at timeframe t of day n, the updated set of probabilities is given by
where η l ∈ (0, 1] is the learning speed. Note that each timeframe is evaluated once per day. That is, one day corresponds to one iteration of the learning mechanism.
c) Search range scheme: In order for Algorithm 1 to work, A b jl =i must contain b jl =i . Hence, if the actual aggregate bid does not lie in the initial estimation of the action set, the algorithm will not be able to predict it. Then again, even (15) and (16) 15: Calculate p kl (t, n + 1) based on (17) if the initial estimation is correct, the algorithm will not be able to follow any changes of b jl =i outside the predefined range. Therefore, an extension of the variable parameter space scheme described in [29] is used. The aim of this scheme is to center the probability distribution obtained by Algorithm 1 by expanding and reducing A b jl =i (and consequently, the associated discretized A b jl =i ). The distribution is centered in order to assure that b jl =i falls within A b jl =i , and to improve the mechanism's convergence speed. There are two pairs of important parameters in the search range scheme, which are the expansion ( r l ) and the reduction (ρ r l ) rates, defined as the speed with which the range is expanded/reduced, and the expansion ( cl ) and reduction (ρ c l ) coefficients. A low expansion/reduction rate/coefficient (i.e. low r l , ρ r l , c l and ρ c l values) could enable the search range scheme to follow rapid b jl =i variations. Conversely, big expansion/reduction rates/coefficients (i.e. high r l , ρ r l , c l and ρ c l values) might impede the convergence of the algorithm. Let us first define the conditions used by the search range scheme: where μ SR l and ΔL SR l are minimum and maximum thresholds, and b p jl =i is the pth percentile of b jl =i . Initially, the algorithm presented in [29] only defines conditions C 1 and C 6 . However, conditions C 2 -C 5 have been proposed to cope with the described scenario. Condition C 2 is used when the distribution's mode is at b max jl =i . The same applies to C 3 , but for the lower endpoint b min jl =i . Condition C 4 is used when the algorithm is in a stalemate due to the actual bid being far from A b jl =i , so that r kl (t, n) = 0. Finally, C 5 is examined only when none of the rest is satisfied. It is applied when the mechanism is in a stalemate and does not place A b jl =i close to the real bid. Based on conditions C 1 -C 6 , the action set A b jl =i is updated as,
where χ n = r l for n = [1, 4] ; χ 6 = ρ r l ; ψ 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Scenario Description and Parameters
The scenario used for the numerical analysis in this section consists of N = 2 MSPs and an SCO with two SC clusters of co-channel small cells in the MSPs' overlapping macrocell coverage areas. In order to increase their profits and throughput, the MSPs participate in the auctions conducted by the SCO, and decide on the bid prices according to the bandwidth requirements (i.e. x i ), and the auction competition. According to his business strategy, the SCO selects offline the value of z, which remains static for periods significantly longer than the auction timeframes. The values of the main parameters used in our simulations are obtained from Small Cell Forum's reports [25] and listed in Table I . In the baseline scenario, 60% of the offered load is generated in the hotspots, and the remaining 40% outside the hotspots (i.e.
In general, an SC cluster is comprised of a set of street-level SCs connected to a Network Termination Point (NTP) through a multi-hop millimeter-wave wireless network [25] . A custom-made MATLAB ® -based simulator has been developed to calculate the spectral efficiency values shown in Table II . The simulator is compliant with the guidelines provided by 3GPP in [30] - [32] .
B. Network Throughput
The impact of the competition among MSPs and the differences arisen with dedicated spectrum and co-channel deployments are analysed in the described scenario with two clusters of N sc1 = N sc2 = 4 SCs and a backhaul capacity C BH1 = C BH2 = 200 Mbps. Moreover, in order to shed light on the impact of spatial traffic variations, we consider two hotspot traffic allocations: in the first one, (Fig. 2) , and in the second one (Fig. 3) . In this scenario, we assume that the MSPs have no a priori knowledge on their load nor their opponents' bids. Hence, we conduct simulations with the use of the proposed learning mechanism to acquire the following results. Traffic served by (a) the SC clusters and (b) MSP 1 's throughput versus the total offered load for MSP 1 , with
during the auctions none of the clusters is prioritized and therefore
It can be observed in Fig. 2a that L h1 is completely served by the SCO until it reaches a maximum level, after which the SCO is unable to serve more traffic. This maximum L sc 1 differs depending on the competition among MSPs (or, in other words, the offered load of M SP 2 ) and the spectrum deployment use case. Focusing on the results of M SP 1 in a scenario without competition (i.e. L 2 = 0 Mbps), Fig. 2a shows that the maximum offloaded traffic (L sc 1 ) is higher for the dedicated spectrum option than for the co-channel use case. This is explained by the access link capacity of the SCO in each case. In that sense, if no cost or backhaul capacity restrictions were considered, the maximum offloaded traffic could be found from its definition as
Based on this assumption, the maximum offloaded traffic is calculated in the hypothetical case where all bandwidth is transferred from M SP 1 to the SCO (i.e. X i = 1). Specifically, if X i = 1, the maximum offloaded traffic is L 1 is limited by the backhaul capacity ( l∈NC C BH l = 400 Mbps) in the dedicated spectrum case, and by the access link capacity (namely the spectral efficiency of the SCs) in the co-channel case. As expected, L sc 1 falls as L 2 increases, since the backhaul capacity is shared out among the two MSPs.
As for L 2 = 400 Mbps in Fig. 2a , it can be seen that L
Mbps. The same occurs to M SP 2 due to symmetry, and so an important outcome can be stated. In general, for a set of N MSPs with equal cost functions, and
is not limited by the access link capacity, but by C BH l ), the SC capacity is equally divided among the set of 
are equal ∀i, j ∈ N , l ∈ N C and i = j. In other words, under high competition scenarios, C BH l is equally shared among MSPs. This is due to the fact that the cost incurred by an MSP to offload a unit of load increases with the competition, but it is upper bounded. In particular, the bid will never be higher than the value that makes the cost of offloading be above the cost of not offloading. If all MSPs have the same cost functions, they all bid the same amount, when L hi is high, and therefore they offload the same amount of traffic (according to Definition 1). as long as the hotspot traffic is completely served (this fact is proved in Proposition 3). Conversely, when the hotspot load is not completely served, the scenario that provides the best results in terms of total served load will depend on the spectral efficiency in each case.
As in Fig. 2, Fig 3a, 3b , and 3c depict M SP 1 's offloaded traffic at the SC clusters (L 
Similarly, when C BH is equally divided between the two MSPs, the maximum L DT i of each M SP i is the same in both use cases, however it is achieved for different levels of competition (i.e. for
Impact of Backhaul Capacity: According to the results obtained previously, Lsc 1 can be limited either by C BH l or by the SCO access link capacity (N sc l B 1 x 1 SE sc l ). It was also noted that the dedicated spectrum deployment presents higher access link capacity than the co-channel deployment, and therefore it is more likely to be limited by C BH l . We consider the same scenario as previously, but the backhaul capacity values vary within the range C BH l ∈ [100, 1000] Mbps. In order to analyse the impact of C BH l , the metric defined Fig. 4 when Fig. 4a shows that, regardless N sc , both use cases (dedicated spectrum and co-channel) provide similar results when C BH l is small, thereby obtaining Θ i ∼ = 0. As observed in Fig. 2 Θ i falls. Finally, Θ i stabilizes when the dedicated spectrum deployment also becomes limited by the access link capacity.
In Fig. 4a , Θ 1 falls slower for (N sc1 , N sc2 ) = (6, 6) than for (N sc1 , N sc2 ) = (4, 4) (e.g. Θ 1 is −224Mbps and −92Mbps respectively for C BH l = 300Mbps). Hence, the maximum access link capacity depends not only on the spectral efficiency, but also on the SC density. Based on this, it is clear in Fig. 4a that the increase of the access link capacity achieved in a denser SC cluster (i.e. high N sc ) is translated into a slower fall of Θ i . Fig. 4b plots the same results when L 2 is high and, therefore, C BH l is shared between M SP 1 and M SP 2 . The explanation is exactly the same as for Fig. 4a , though in this case, and according to the outcome discussed previously, M SP 1 can lease SC capacity equal to C BH l /2 instead of C BH l (M SP 2 leases the rest of C BH l ).
C. Stakeholders' Profits
There is a tight relation between the auction results depicted in Fig. 2 and the profit obtained by the MSP and the SCO. In order to highlight it, Fig. 5a and 5b show M SP 1 's and SCO's profit respectively, for the same scenario and use case as in Fig. 2 . Regarding P 1 , we observe that it follows the same trend as L T 1 . This behaviour is explained with (6) . Particularly, by offloading volumes of traffic significantly larger than what his own eNB can serve, M SP 1 generates revenue that covers both his OPEX (i.e. CL 1 ) and the offloading cost (i.e. the bids).
Regarding the SCO's profit, we observe in Fig. 5b that P sc is convex. This is explained by the fact that the MSPs place bids close to the reserve price for low to medium total demand (as will be explained in Section V-E). Hence, P sc l is slightly higher than P min sc l = (z − 1)CL sc l , which is convex. We further observe the impact of the MSP competition on the SCO profit. Particularly, we see that as the competition 
increases (i.e. L 2 = {200, 400}Mbps), P sc becomes saturated for lower L 1 values. This is explained by the fact that the higher the competition, the higher the need for SC capacity. Thus, P sc will be high when all of the contending MSPs have high offloading demands. Finally, it can be seen that P sc is higher with the dedicated spectrum deployment. This occurs because with the dedicated spectrum deployment the MSPs offload slightly more traffic than with the co-channel deployment, as observed in Fig. 2a .
D. Auction Scheme Comparison
In this section, we conduct a comparison between our proposed Proportional Fair Auction scheme (PF) and the wellknown First-Price sealed bid auction scheme (FPA) [33] . Particularly, we solve the SWM problem in (12) , and compare the performance of each auction in terms of offloaded traffic (L sc i ), and total system throughput ( i∈N L T i ). In FPA, the highest bidder wins the auction, and pays the bid he had submitted. In order to adjust FPA in our system model, we consider the following. We assume that two MSPs place their bids b 1l and b 2l in order to lease L 
, L sc l will be allocated among the MSPs according to the following rule:
The winning bid of M SP i b il , i ∈ {1, 2}, l ∈ N C is the one that maximizes the SC cluster l's profit, that is, the winning bid is given by b il = arg max Conversely, we observe for both spectrum deployments that with the FPA scheme most of the SC capacity is allocated to the MSP with the highest offered load. Moreover, the opponent MSP does not offload the remaining SC capacity. This occurs because the allocation rule overcharges the loser of the auction. We notice that for L 2 = 400 Mbps and L 1 ≤400 Mbps, where M SP 2 wins the auctions, M SP 1 does not lease the remaining C BH l . Conversely, M SP 1 wins the auctions for L 1 > 400 Mbps and offloads as much traffic as possible
The results of the above allocation rules are shown in Fig. 7a 
compared FPA scheme. The sum throughput is the same for both auctions schemes when there is no competition (i.e. L 2 = 0), since the bidding behaviour is the same as explained previously. When the competition is higher (i.e. L 2 > 0), PF achieves higher throughput than FPA. This occurs due to the allocation rule of FPA, which favours the winner, but disincentivizes the loser with expensive SC capacity. Thus, we observe that when the competition is high (i.e. 
Mbps), the gradient increases up to the point that the maximum sum throughput is achieved. Fig. 7c and 7d depict the Social Welfare (P = i∈N P i + P sc ) for the dedicated spectrum and co-channel deployments as a function of M SP 1 's offered load (L 1 ) for different M SP 2 offered load levels (L 2 ). Due to the tight relation between the MSP throughput and profit (also observed in Fig. 5a ), we notice that the SW shows a trend similar to that of the sum throughput. Hence, it can be observed in Fig. 7c and 7d that PF either outperforms or performs equally with FPA.
From the above we conclude that the PF scheme results in a more balanced allocation of the SC capacity, which leads to higher throughput and profits for the auction stakeholders.
E. Learning Mechanism Performance
The performance of the learning mechanism described in Section IV-B.2 is evaluated in a scenario where future loads and opponents' bids are unknown. We use the same scenario and use case as in subsection V-B (i.e. N sc1 = N sc2 = 4, C BH1 = C BH2 = 200Mbps, and L h il = 0.3 · L i , ∀i ∈ N , ∀l ∈ N C ) for 2 MSPs. Regarding L i , the day is divided into T = 24 timeframes, and the traffic pattern for both MSPs is modelled as a bimodal distribution with two peaks, the first one at timeframe t = 12 and the second one at t = 16. In the simulation, each L i instance is randomly generated according to this pattern. Table III shows the values of the parameters for the three algorithms that compose the learning mechanism, which have been obtained through simulations. Fig. 8a and 8b show the convergence of the estimation errors Δb 21 and ΔL sc 11 , respectively, within a range of 31 days (note that the estimation of each timeframe is carried out once per day, and thus 31 days are equivalent to 31 iterations). It can be observed that despite the initial poor estimates of b 21 , the mechanism accomplishes estimation errors of the order [-10,10]% within the first 8-14 iterations in all timeframes, and small errors upon convergence (e.g. |ΔL sc 11 | < 6% and |Δb 21 | < 7.5%).
It is observed that the highest absolute estimation errors of b 21 occur at t = {7, 19, 21, 24}, far from the two peak hours defined at t = 12 and t = 16. In fact, the absolute error |b 21 − b 21 | is higher for high loaded timeframes, but the significant differences between b 21 in high and low loaded timeframes makes Δb 21 be higher for low loaded timeframes.
In order to see the impact of these errors, Fig. 9 shows the throughput, the profit and the bid of M SP 1 when all the information is available to all stakeholders (i.e. the SWM problem defined in (12) is solved and ΔL sc 11 = Δb 21 = 0), and when information is not available and the learning mechanism is used (i.e. with ΔL sc 11 and Δb 21 shown in Fig. 8 ). It can be observed in Fig. 9a that the served load (or throughput) achieved with the learning mechanism matches almost perfectly the results obtained when all information is known. This good performance is owing to: i) good estimations plotted in Fig. 8 , and ii) less accurate estimations occur when capacity needs are less stringent.
Similar results are obtained in Fig. 9b for the profit of M SP 1 , P 1 . However, it is worth noting that the profit decreases with the learning mechanism at timeframe t = 12 (the peak hour). This reduction of the profit is the result of a high bid at t = 12 (depicted in Fig. 9c) . If the offered bid b 1 is higher than the reserve price (the bid when all information is available), the profit drops. Generally, the high bid is a consequence of the overestimation of b 2l and/or L sc 1l . In this particular case, Fig. 8 shows at t = 12 that ΔL sc 11 > 0 and Δb 21 < 0; the former overestimates L sc 11 and the latter underestimates b 21 . Therefore, the overestimation of L sc 11 causes the decrease of the profit. Yet, despite the slight decrease in the profit experienced during the peak hour, the learning mechanism presents a very good performance in the simulated scenario.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we studied traffic offloading under the SCaaS approach, where a small cell operator owns the SC infrastructure, and the mobile service providers transfer spectrum resources to serve their users. The problem of the efficient capacity distribution, both from a network and a financial perspective, has been modelled with a proportionally fair auction scheme. We further show that the uncertainty about future traffic load poses the necessity to develop learning mechanisms to assist the auction. Modified versions of the HW method and the Exp3 algorithm have been proposed to deal with the load forecasting and the opponents' bid estimation, respectively. Extensive simulations with the proposed mechanism were used to study the MSPs' auction strategies, for two spectrum deployments, and different SC densities. The results show how the competition level among the MSPs impacts their profit and capacity, and analyse their trade-off. Moreover, they reveal that the capacity is limited by either technical (i.e. backhaul or spectral efficiency) or economic causes, and explain how they are connected to the MSPs' competition. Finally, we show that the proposed forecasting, learning and auction scheme copes with the uncertainty efficiently, and provides results comparable with scenarios without uncertainty.
In this paper, we consider the case of a single SCO offering SCaaS to multiple MSPs. Hence, as the SCO is the sole SCaaS provider in the system, he can act as a monopoly. This case is more suited to scenarios where there can be a single SCO in the area under study (e.g. stadiums, airports etc.). A future direction and interesting case study considers multiple SCOs in the same area. In this case, not only the MSPs, but also the SCOs compete among them. The SCOs need to set their prices properly in order to lease their capacity and gain profit. On the other hand, the MSPs need to adapt their strategies not only according to the competition among them, but also according to the available choices in SC capacity and prices.
